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1  Introduction  
Zambia’s  11  million  people  occupy  a  large  swath  of  fertile  but  landlocked  farmland  in  the 
central  part  of  southern  Africa  (Figure  1).      Given  its  low  population  density,  abundant 
subsurface water, large tracts of cultivable farmland and proximity to large neighboring deficit 
food  markets,  Zambia  enjoys  significant  potential  as  a  prospective  regional  food  exporter.  
Despite this considerable agricultural potential, Zambia remains intermittently food deficit (in 
poor harvest years), autarkic (in normal years) and food surplus (in good harvest years).  Maize 
prices fluctuate considerably from year to year as a result of domestic production volatility and 
a penchant for government control of cross-border trade in food staples.   
  
Figure 1. Population Density in South East Africa 
 
Source: Haggblade, Longabaugh and Tschirley (2009).   
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2  Importance of staple foods in the diet  
Maize dominates food consumption in Zambia, providing over half of all calories consumed 
(Table 1).  Cassava serves as the second most important food staple nationally, and in some 
regions it is the preferred staple.  In recent decades, wheat has become increasingly important 
as a third basic staple food, particularly in urban areas where it now accounts for higher budget 
share than maize (Mason and Jayne, 2009).
5   
Within Zambia, regional consumption patterns differ quite sharply.  As in much of South 
Eastern  Africa,  Zambia  enco mpasses  three  major  food  staple  zones.    Maize  dominates 
consumption baskets in southern and eastern Zambia, while cassava predominates in parts of 
the north as it does in northern Malawi and coastal parts of northern Mozambique (Figure 2).  
Northern and northwestern Zambia  form a transition zone between the maize and cassava 
belts, with household consumption of large quantities of both cassava and maize .  This dual-
staple zone, where households consume a seasonally and inter-annually variable blend of maize 
and cassava-based food products, covers a wide swath of northern Zambia, Malawi and 
Mozambique.   
National per capita averages, therefore, camouflage a wide variation in consumption patterns 
across these different food staple zones (Table 2).  Across all  zones, urban areas tend to favor 
wheat consumption, relative to rural areas.  As a result, the impact of maize price volatility 





Table 1. Consumption of Major Food Staples in Zambia 
Commodity Quantity consumed Daily caloric intake Share of caloric intake
(kg/person/year) (kcal/person/day) (percent)
Maize 133 1122 57%
Cassava 83 252 13%
Wheat 17 136 7%
Others 111 465 24%
Total 345 1975 100%  
Source: FAO (2009). 
 
                                                      
5 Given that wheat prices exceed those of maize, the caloric contribution of maize still remains larger than wheat, 
particularly for low-income urban households.   Food prices in Zambia  Page 3 
 
 
Figure 2. Food Staple Zones in South East Africa 
 
 
Source: Haggblade, Longabaugh and Tschirley (2009).   
 










rural 161 92 57 124
urban 156 117 119 146
national 159 98 61 131
Cassava (dry weight)
rural 2 65 89 35
urban 3 26 38 9
national 3 56 87 27
Maize plus cassava
rural 163 157 147 159
urban 159 143 157 155
national 161 154 147 158
Food Staple Zone
 
Source: Haggblade, Longabaugh and Tschirley 2009).   Food prices in Zambia  Page 4 
 
 
3  Production and trade of main staple foods 
3.1  Maize  
Over the past twenty years, between 1980 and 2009, Zambia’s maize production has gyrated 
wildly around its long-term average of 1.1 million metric tons per year (Table 3, Figure 3).  This 
considerable production variability has translated into wide swings in the price of Zambia’s 
principal food staple.  It has likewise translated into an intermittent need for imports.    
In terms of actual trade flows, Zambia’s maize availability changes from year to year, along with 
its variable maize harvest.  It good harvest years, such as 1988 and 2009, Zambia produces a 
surplus for export.  But in poor years, such as 1992, 2002 and 2005, Zambia requires substantial 
maize imports.  During the 2005 to 2007 period, covering one below-average and two above-
average years, Zambia imported roughly 5% of maize requirements (Table 4).   
 







Maize Cassava, dry weight Wheat
 
Source: FAOSTAT, MACO.   




Table 3. Trends in Staple Food Production in Zambia (5-year centered moving averages) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 average
maize 972             1,045          1,292          1,145          782             1,206          1,489          1,105        
cassava, dry weight 97               111             182             221             270             292             325             212           
wheat 11               17                52                59                73               113             164             66                
Source: FAOSTAT and MACO Food Balance Sheets.   
 
 
Table 4. Production and trade of main staple foods in Zambia (2005-2007 averages) 
Commodity Production
as % of as % of
(1000 tonnes) (1000 tonnes) consumption (1000 tonnes) consumption
Maize 1,219                 60                       4.8% 33                       2.7%
Cassava 982                    0                         0.0% -                     0.0%
Wheat 116                    72                       38.3% 0                         0.0%
Others 3,323                 215                    6.7% 329                    9.9%
Total 5,640                 346                    6.2% 362                    6.4%
Imports Exports
 
Source: FAO (2009).  
 
 
3.2  Cassava 
Cassava and wheat production, however, have proven less volatile, cassava because of its well-
known  drought  tolerance  and  wheat  because  it  is  frequently  grown  under  center  pivot 
irrigation.  Both cassava and wheat production have grown steadily over the past twenty years 
(Figure 3, Table 3).  By 2009, Zambia was largely self-sufficient in both secondary staples.   
Although Zambia does export small quantities of dried cassava to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo  (Figure  4),  domestic  prices  of  cassava  are  largely  determined  by  local  supply  and 
demand.  Given large substitution possibilities between cassava and maize, particularly in the 
cassava  belt  and  dual  staple  zones,  the  domestic  maize  price  influences  both  demand  for 















* Prices in thousands of Kwacha per 50 kg bag.   
Source: Haggblade and Nyembe (2007).   
 
 
3.3  Wheat 
 
Both maize and wheat are internationally traded commodities in Zambia (Table 4).  With wheat, 
Zambia has historically required imports.  But given steady production gains (Table 3), by 2009 
Zambia’s production of 195,000 tons of wheat met Zambia’s consumption requirements.  To 
protect Zambian wheat farmers, government instituted a ban on wheat imports in 2009 (Times 




4  Staple food price patterns 
4.1  Relative prices 
Relative to maize meal, the dominant food staple in Zambia, wheat-based products cost roughly 
triple (Table 5).   Because cassava is very thinly traded outside the northern Zambia, and given 
large transport costs between the surplus zones in the north and the cassava importing zones in 
the south, the cassava to maize price varies substantially across zones (Figure 4).  In the cassava 
belt and dual staple zones of northern Zambia, dried cassava products (chips and flour) sell for 
50% to 70% of the price of straight-run maize meal (mugaiwa).  However, in the maize belt of 
central, southern and eastern Zambia, cassava costs more than maize (Table 6).  Given high 
transport costs from northern Zambia to Lusaka and given that cassava flour is typically sold in 
very small units (usually 1 kilogram bags), reported unit retail prices for cassava flour in central 
and southern Zambia often substantially exceed the price of maize meal.   
 
Table 5. Retail food prices in Zambia, $ US 
average January 2008 through June 2009 
Price
maize, roller meal 0.39 $       
wheat flour 1.43 $         
Source: CSO.   
 
 




Cassava-based dual staple zone
Mansa flour/mugaiwa 444 889 0.50
Kawambwa flour/mugaiwa 444 778 0.57
Dual staple zone
Kasama chips/grain 469 778 0.60
Serenje chips/grain 444 667 0.67
Maize belt
Lusaka chips/grain 800 700 1.14
Prices (Kw/kg)
 
Source: Haggblade and Nymebe (2008).   
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4.2  Spatial price differences 
Food prices vary spatially in Zambia.  Maize and cassava prices are lowest in rural production 
zones and highest in urban areas.  Wheat products, particularly bread, are sold mostly in urban 
areas.   
In Zambia’s urban centers, maize prices are typically highest in Lusaka and Ndola and 10% to 
20% lower in Chipata, Kabwe and Choma.   
 
 
Table 7. Spatial differences in white maize wholesale prices 
Choma Lusaka Kabwe Ndola Chipata
Price ($US per tonne)
2005 158 162 146 155 148
2006 148 175 148 189 167
2007 132 169 157 173 115
2008 226 255 204 247 197
Price relative to Lusaka wholesale price
2005 0.98 1.00 0.90 0.96 0.91
2006 0.85 1.00 0.84 1.08 0.95
2007 0.78 1.00 0.93 1.03 0.68
2008 0.88 1.00 0.80 0.97 0.77
average 0.87 1.00 0.87 1.01 0.83  
Source: Agricultural Market Information Centre. 




4.3  Price seasonality 
 
Seasonally, maize prices fluctuate about 40% from the harvest-time trough to the lean-season 
peak.  Maize meal prices fluctuate less, only about 10%, during the year.  And bread prices 
remain essentially flat throughout the year (Figure 5).     
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4.4  Price changes over time 
Over  the  past  decade,  prices  of  maize,  maize  meal  and  wheat  have  trended  generally 
downwards when valued in real Kwacha.  Although maize prices spiked in 2002 and 2003, real 
wheat prices declined steadily between 2000 and 2009.  In 2008, maize prices rose by about 
10% higher than 2007 levels, though they did not reach the levels attained in 2002 and 2003 
(Figure 6a). 
When denominated in dollars, however, the 2008 maize price spike exceeded that of 2002.  
From 2007 to 2008, dollar-denominated maize prices increased by about 40%.  In large part, the 
price increases of 2005 and 2008 mirror the roughly 30% strengthening of the Kwacha against 
the US dollar (Figure 6b and 6c).  For most Zambians, who are paid in Kwacha, the 2008 price 
increases were less significant in real terms than the large price spikes of 2002 and 2003.   
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Figure 6. Staple food prices  











Maize, wholesale Breakfast meal, retail Bread, retail
 












Maize, wholesale Breakfast meal, retail Bread, retail
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Domestic  prices  have  generally  remained  below  import  parity.    In  several  years  (1998  and 
2000),  import  parity  has  capped  domestic  price  increases.    In  several  notable  instances, 
however, they have not.  In both 2002 and 2003, domestic prices spike above import parity for 
brief  periods.    In  both  instances,  uncertainties  about  the  level  and  pricing  of  government 
imports  limited  private  import  volumes  (Nijhoff  et  al.  2002,  2003).    Similarly  in  2005,  late 
government decision-making on import permits, tariffs, and phytosanitary controls diminished 
private sector interest in maize import and imposed delays that led to significant transport cost 
escalation, both of which contributed to a rapid maize price run-up in late 2005 and early 2006 
(Mwanaumo et al. 2005).   
 












Import parity, South Africa Lusaka wholesale price
 
Source: AMIC, SAFEX.   
 
5  Food price policy 
5.1  Maize 
Maize has consistently reigned as “King of Crops” in Zambian food policy circles, and the maize 
price remains the most politically sensitive price in the economy.  Since independence in 1964, 
Zambian policy makers have focused public subsidies and policy attention on white maize, the 
country’s primary food staple.  Over this period, policy stances have changed during three 
distinct phases. 
  1964 to 1990.  During the 25 years following independence, the Zambian government 
tightly controlled maize prices (both farmgate and consumer prices), as well as input prices and 
trade, all through a monopoly awarded to the parastatal National Agricultural Marketing Board 
(NAMBOARD).  NAMBOARD supplied subsidized inputs and guaranteed purchases of maize at a Food prices in Zambia  Page 12 
 
fixed pan-territorial price.  Nationalized maize mills sold mealy meal at subsidized prices to 
urban consumers, while copper revenues financed these massive subsidies.  At their peak, in 
1986, consumer and producer maize subsidies accounted for 17% of total government spending 
(Howard  and  Mungoma,  1996).    With  the  decline  in  world  copper  prices,  the  Zambian 
government could no longer afford these substantial subsidies for the country’s predominant 
food staple.   
Under heavy fiscal and donor pressure, the government disbanded NAMBOARD and liberalized 
maize markets through a series of reforms beginning in the late 1980’s.  Early efforts to reduce 
urban maize subsidies, in 1986 and 1990, led to food riots in the Copperbelt and Lusakia.  As a 
result, Zambian political leaders remain acutely aware of the political sensitivity of maize pricing 
policy.   
  1990 to 2004.  After campaigning on a platform of maize market reform, the newly 
installed Chiluba government began its reform efforts in 1991 by dismantling NAMBOARD and 
issuing licenses to private maize traders.  But the halving of national maize production during 
the drought of 1992 led to immediate pressure to resume heavy government involvement in 
both import and domestic marketing of maize.  Not until the 1994/95 production season did 
government  refrain  from  announcing  maize  prices  (Howard  and  Mungoma,  1996).    After 
dismantling  the  NAMBOARD  in  1991,  government  established  a  new  Food  Reserve  Agency 
(FRA) in 1995 to maintain security stocks.  FRA purchases remained nominal  until the mid 
2000’s (Table 6).   
Even after liberalization of domestic maize trade, Zambia’s government continued to play an 
active role influencing the level of maize imports and exports.  Government, at various times, 
imported directly, awarded import permits to private traders, issued publicly financed tenders 
for private import, and in some cases subsidized sale through privatize mills.   
This active government involvement, coupled with unpredictable policy positions, has tended 
to  discourage  commercial  cross-border  maize  trade.    Uncertainties  about  access  to  import 
permits, tariff levels and possible government price subsidies led to clearly diminished trader 
interest in maize imports in 2002 and 2005 (Nijhoff et al. 2002, 2003, Mwanaumo et al. 2005).  
As  a  result,  many  government  officials  mistrust  private  traders.    Given  the  frequent  policy 
changes and the unpredictability of government trade quotas, tariff and pricing decisions, the 
mistrust is mutual.   
  2005 to 2009.  Amendment of the Food Reserve Act, in 2005, resulted in dramatic 
changes in the level of FRA involvement in Zambian maize markets.  Since then, the FRA has 
opened up over 600 buying depots through the country to buy maize from smallholder farmers 
at pan-territorial prices, generally far above wholesale market price.  In 2006, for example, the 
FRA paid $192 per ton, and in 2007 they purchased maize at $186 per ton (Govereh, Jayne and 
Chapoto, 2008).  During the presidential election year of 2006, the FRA purchased 390,000 tons 
of maize from smallholder farmers.  This amounted to over 90% smallholder marketed volumes 
(Table 6).  Since 2005, the FRA has dominated maize trading in Zambia.   
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Table 6. Food Reserve Agency Purchases of Maize 






1991 1991/92 - - 1,097               608                  -                   -                  
1992 1992/93 - - 483                  216                  -                   -                  
1993 1993/94 - - 1,598               642                  -                   -                  
1994 1994/95 - - 1,021               363                  -                   -                  
1995 1995/96 - - 738                  265                  -                   -                  
1996 1996/97 - - 1,409               277                  -                   -                   10.5 4% 1%
1997 1997/98 - - 960                  185                  -                   -                   5 3% 1%
1998 1998/99 582 56                    638                  157                  117                  64                    0 0% 0%
1999 1999/00 - - 856                  217                  -                   -                   0 0% 0%
2000 2000/01 - - 1,053               272                  -                   -                   0 0% 0%
2001 2001/02 614 188                  802                  198                  121                  171                  0 0% 0%
2002 2002/03 418 184                  602                  195                  -                   -                   23 12% 4%
2003 2003/04 823 384                  1,207               291                  218                  382                  55 19% 5%
2004 2004/05 994 220                  1,214               357                  247                  234                  105 29% 9%
2005 2005/06 598 268                  866                  289                  115                  235                  79 27% 9%
2006 2006/07 1,107 317                  1,424               426                  358                  -                   390 92% 27%
2007 2007/08 1,104 262                  1,366               398                  224                  396 99% 29%
2008 2008/09 988 224 1,212               357                  174                 
2009 2009/10 1,889               -                   -                  
as a percent of
FRA domestic purchases Maize sales Year Maize production ('000 tons)
 
Source: Govereh, Jayne and Chapoto (2008), MACO.   
 
 
5.2  Cassava 
Beginning  in  2005,  the  newly  reconstituted  FRA  added  cassava  to  its  list  of  purchased 
commodities, paying a price of 500 to 700 Kwacha per kilogram, well above the market price of 
15,000 to 20,000 per 50 kg bag (equivalent to 283 to 377 Kwacha/kilogram). During the 2006 
season, when the FRA offered a price 30% to 50% higher than the prevailing market price, they 
were able to procure their entire 2,400 ton cassava quota in less than two weeks (Haggblade 
and Nyembe, 2008).  However, given the high procurement price, they were unable to sell their 
stocks.  Ultimately, they sold a small portion of their stocks at a loss and wrote off the rest.  
Since 2007, FRA has been reluctant to purchase cassava.  As a result, the domestic cassava 
market and small exported volumes remain largely unregulated.   
5.3  Wheat 
Until 2009, Zambia’s wheat consumption has exceeded domestic production.  Consequently, 
Zambia has required regular, substantial volumes of wheat imports.  The Zambian government 
has regulated these imports by issuing quantitative permits under the Control of Goods Act.   
In  past  years,  the  government  has  issued  wheat  import  permits  as  requested  by  millers.  
However, as Zambian farmers approached wheat self-sufficiency in 2009, the Zambia National 
Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) lobbied government for protection from imports.  In June 2009, the 
government announced a ban on wheat imports (Times, 2009).   
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5.4  Current food policy  
  5.4.1. Trade policy 
Zambia  controls  trade  in  maize  and  wheat  through  a  system  of  quantitative  restrictions 
regulated  under the  Control  of  Goods  Act.    Both  imports  and  exports  require  government 
permits stipulating the allowable quantities traded.  In recent years, the Food Reserve Agency 
has received the bulk of the trading permits for both the import and export of maize.   
Zambia likewise imposes import tariffs of 15% on maize.  During shortfall production years, as 
in  2005,  government  suspended  the  maize  import  tariff.    However  in  2008,  after  lengthy 
negotiations with the private sector, government declined to waive the maize import duty.   
  5.4.2. Public food stocks 
In 1996, the Zambian government established a Food Reserve Agency (FRA) to hold buffer small 
food security stocks to ensure domestic supplies and to provide liquidity in the maize market 
during the initial years of market liberalization.  Amendment of the Food Reserve Act, in 2005, 
dramatically increased the level of FRA involvement in Zambian maize markets.  Since then, the 
FRA has opened up over 600 buying depots through the country to buy maize from smallholder 
farmers.  In recent years, the FRA has purchased about 25% of the national maize harvest and  
held carry-over maize stocks ranging from 100,000 to 250,000 tons.  
5.4.3. Price controls 
The FRA sets a fixed pan-territorial procurement price for maize.  Though not legally binding on 
private traders, the FRA price typically exceeds the commercial market price.   
Consumer  prices,  though  not  regulated  explicitly,  remain  the  subject  of  ongoing,  highly 
publicized discussions between government and millers.  During shortfall production years, the 
government  typically  sets  price  guidance  for  maize  millers,  particularly  when  government 
supplies subsidized imports or FRA maize to the mills.   
5.5  Response to the food crisis 
Between June 2008 and June 2007, maize prices increased by 9% in real Kwacha and 40% in 
nominal US dollars.  Even at these levels, 2008 prices were well below the levels attained during 
the production shortfall of 2001/02 (Figure 6).  Nonetheless, in response to general concerns 
over maize prices and tightening world cereal markets, the Zambian government took several 
temporary  measures  to  moderate  maize  price  increases:  •  they  banned  maize  exports,  • 
considered reduction in the maize import duty, and • sold subsidized maize to millers in order 
to moderate maize meal prices for consumers.  They also allocated additional resources for 
fertilizer subsidies in the 2008/09 production season.   
The impact of these actions remains the subject of ongoing debate.  Despite the maize export 
ban, informal exports continued, though possibly at lower level than prior years, to DRC and 
also to Zimbabwe (Govereh, 2009).  Initial discussion of the 15% import duty waiver collapsed in 
August  2008  when  the  Attorney  General  advised  the  government  against  giving  traders 
concessions to import maize.  Some private imports did occur, though some traders cancelled 
their options to purchase maize on the SAFEX exchange, while others redirected their South Food prices in Zambia  Page 15 
 
African  maize  purchases  to  other  countries  in  the  region.    Between  December  2008  and 
February 2009, government spent 351 million Kwacha subsidizing FRA maize sales to millers.   
While this did appear to place downward pressure on maize meal prices during this period, the 
government suspended this program in Mach 2009 after allegations that millers were failing to 
pass along the full price discount to consumers (Govereh, 2009).  The last of the government 
emergency responses, their expanded fertilizer subsidies in late 2008, contributed to a near-
record maize harvest in 2009 (Figure 1) and to record spending, as fertilizer subsidies consumed 
nearly half of all agricultural spending (Govereh, 2009).   
6  Summary and conclusions 
Volatility in maize production and in maize prices drives food policy in Zambia.  Following an 
initial  liberalization  of  maize  markets  in  the  early  1990’s,  following  the  bankruptcy  of  the 
government  marketing  parastatal  NAMBOARD,  the  Zambian  government  has  gradually 
resumed a larger and larger role in maize markets.  Government also routinely controls maize 
and wheat imports and exports through quantitative restrictions imposed under the Control of 
Good Act.  Cassava, however, remains largely unregulated.   
As an intermittent surplus producer and periodic importer of maize, Zambia would seem poised 
to benefit from regional trade opportunities, as an exporter in some years and an importer in 
others.  Unpredictable policies (in particular, uncertainties over import quotas, tariffs and FRA 
release prices) have discouraged private maize trade.   This, in turn, has reinforced government 
suspicion that they cannot rely on private traders to supply food markets during crisis years, a 
sentiment that has fueled the renewed dominance of the FRA and government trade controls.  
This mutual caution and mistrust, between government and private traders, has resulted in 
periods (such as 2002 and 2003) when domestic maize prices have exceeded import parity 
(Figure 7).  As a result, Zambian food prices have fluctuated more than necessary in some years.   
In the medium run, price moderation through regional trade will require improved efficiency 
among marketing agents as well as transparent and predictable policy signals.  Over the long 
run, consumption diversification out of maize and into wheat and cassava-based foods, feeds 
and beverages will tend to reduce Zambia’s current vulnerability to its erratic maize harvests, 
policies and maize prices.  
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